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Recent Decisions
ALIENABILITY OF PENSION BENEFITS-EMPLOYEE RETRIEMENT IN-
COME SECURITY ACT-The United States Supreme Court held that
a court may not imply an exception to ERISA's anti-alienability
provision in cases where an employee has committed criminal acts
against his employer.
Guidry v Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, - US
-, 110 S Ct 680 (1990).
In 1982, Curtis Guidry was charged with, and pleaded guilty to,
embezzling over $377,000 from the Sheet Metal Workers Interna-
tional Association, Local No. 9 (the "Union").' Guidry's acts were
committed while he was serving as the chief executive officer of the
Union and trustee of the Sheet Metal Workers Local No. 9 Pen-
sion Fund and the acts were in violation of section 501(c) of the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959
("LMRDA").2 As a Union official, Guidry had become a partici-
pant in three pension plans affiliated with the Union.' While serv-
ing a prison sentence for the embezzlement of the Union funds,
Guidry sought to collect pension benefits pursuant to early retire-
ment provisions under the terms of the plans." Two of the plans'
1. Guidry v Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, 110 S Ct 680, 683 (1990).
2. Id. 29 USC § 501(c) provides: "[alny person who embezzles, steals, or unlawfully
and willfully abstracts or converts to his own use, or the use of another, any of the moneys,
funds, securities, property, or other assets of a labor organization of which he is an officer, or
by which he is employed, directly or indirectly, shall be fined not more than $10,000 or
imprisoned for not more than five years, or both."
3. Guidry v National Sheet Metal Workers' National Pension Fund, 641 F Supp 360,
361 (D Colo 1986). Guidry was a participant in the Sheet Metal Workers Local Unions and
Councils Pension Fund, the Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund, and the Sheet
Metal Workers Local No. 9 Pension Fund. Guidry, 110 S Ct 683, n. 2.
4. Guidry had applied for and began receiving benefits from the Local No. 9 Pension
Fund in 1985. Guidry, 641 F Supp at 361.
5. The Sheet Metal Workers Local Unions and Councils Pension Fund and the Sheet
Metal Workers National Pension Fund. Id.
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refused to pay benefits, citing Guidry's wrongful appropriation of
Union funds." Guidry subsequently brought an action in April of
1984 to recover pension benefits from the two plans.7 The action
was brought in the United States District Court for the District of
Colorado pursuant to section 502 of the Employee Retirement In-
come Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA").8 The Union intervened and
joined as a party the Local No. 9 Pension Fund.' The parties then
stipulated to a $275,000 judgment against Guidry with respect to
five of the six claims for relief asserted by the Union.'0
In response to Guidry's claim that he was entitled to pension
benefits, the two pension plans averred that by his criminal deeds,
Guidry had forfeited his pension benefits. 1 The Union contended
that a constructive trust in favor of the Union should be imposed
on the benefits.12
At the outset of its decision, the district court held that the
ERISA prohibition on forfeiture of vested pension benefits pre-
cluded Guidry's benefits from being forfeited.13 However, the court
decided that a constructive trust ' was not barred in spite of the
ERISA ban on the alienation of pension benefits.1 5 The district
6. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 683.
7. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 683. Guidry and the Sheet Metal Workers No. 9 Pension Fund
had previously negotiated a settlement, id, and Guidry began receiving benefits from that
plan in 1985 during the pendency of his claim against the other plans. Guidry, 641 F Supp
at 1458.
8. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 683. ERISA provisions are found at 29 USC sections 1001-
1461. Section 502(a) of ERISA states in pertinent part: "[a] civil action may be brought by a
participant or beneficiary ... (B) to recover benefits due to him under the terms of his
plan .. " 29 USC § 1132(a)(1).
9. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 683.
10. Id. The parties stipulated to five claims, one concerning a breach, by Guidry, of his
fiduciary duty to the Union which was in violation of section 501(a) of LMRDA, and four
others concerning fraud, conversion, equitable restitution and negligence. The sixth claim
was for the Union and pension funds to withhold Guidry's pension benefits. Id, n.5.
11. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 683.
12. Id.
13. Id at 684. Section 203(a) of ERISA provides that "'[elach pension plan shall pro-
vide that an employee's right to his normal retirement benefit is nonforfeitable' if the em-
ployee meets certain age and years of service requirements found in that section." Guidry,
641 F Supp at 360 (quoting 29 USC § 1053(a)).
14. "A constructive trust ...is a trust by operation of law which arises contrary to
intention and in invitum, against one who, by fraud, actual or constructive, by duress or
abuse of confidence, by commission of wrong, or by any form of unconscionable conduct,
artifice, concealment, or questionable means. . .either has obtained or holds the legal right
to property which he ought not, in equity and good conscience, hold and enjoy. It is raised
by equity to satisfy the demands of justice." 76 Am Jur 2d, Trusts § 221 (1975).
15. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 684. Section 206(d)(1) of ERISA provides: "[elach pension
plan shall provide that benefits under the plan may not be assigned or alienated." 29 USC §
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court based its decision in large part on its perception that
"ERISA must be read in pari materia with other important federal
labor legislation," most notably, LMRDA and the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947 which have as their underlying policy
"to combat corruption on the part of union officials and to protect
the interests of the membership.""6 The district court stated, "[i]n
circumstances where the viability of a union and the members'
pension plans was [sic] damaged by the knavery of a union official,
a narrow exception to ERISA's anti-alienation provision is appro-
priate,"17 and in so finding imposed a constructive trust on Gui-
dry's benefits from all three pension plans.18
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit affirmed the district court decision, agreeing that the impo-
sition of a constructive trust was an appropriate form of relief.1 9
However, the appeals court based its decision to except a construc-
tive trust from the ERISA anti-alienability provision, in part, on
relief afforded under ERISA section 409 concerning a pension plan
fiduciary's breach of duty that results in injury to the plan's
participants.20
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari because of
the multifarious interpretations and applications of the ERISA
anti-alienability provision ascribed to the provision by various
courts of appeals.21
1056(d)(1).
16. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 684 (quoting Guidry, 641 F Supp at 362).
17. Id (quoting Guidry, 641 F Supp at 363).
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. The court of appeals relied upon, inter alia, decisions from courts of appeals in
other circuits, e.g., Crawford v La Boucherie Bernard, Ltd., 815 F 2d 117 (D C Cir 1987),
and St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v Cox, 752 F2d 550 (11th Cir 1985), and the princi-
ples of trust law. Id at 684.
The Union alleged that Guidry had breached his fiduciary duty to the Union in violation
of section 501(a) of LMRDA which provides: "[tlhe officers, agents, shop stewards, and
other representatives of a labor organization occupy positions of trust in relation to such
organization and its members as a group. It is, therefore, the duty of each such person...
to hold its money and property solely for the benefit of the organization and its members.
.. 29 USC § 501(a).
The appeals court, however, invoked relief provided by ERISA section 409(a) (29 USC §
1109(a)) concerning breaches by pension plan fiduciaries which injure the plan and its par-
ticipants, reasoning that such an interpretation comports with "[a] major purpose of ERISA
... [which is] to safeguard 'the continued well-being and security of millions of employees
and their dependents . . .[by establishing] minimum standards . . .assuring the equitable
character of [pension fund] plans and their financial soundness.' 29 USC § 1001(a)." Guidry,
856 F2d at 1460. See also, note 34.
21. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 684. The Supreme Court cited several cases from courts of
1990
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A unanimous United States Supreme Court22 reversed, finding
error in both the district and appeals court decisions on the
grounds that, first, the question of whether ERISA permits aliena-
tion of benefits under the circumstances of the present case had
already been decided, albeit in dictum. 3 Second, the appeals court
had based its decision on a pension plan fiduciary having commit-
ted wrongful acts against the plan when in fact there had been no
finding that Guidry had breached any duty to the plan on which
he served as trustee.24 Third, the district court correctly recognized
that LMRDA and ERISA must be read in pari materia; however,
to apply the district court's interpretation would render the anti-
alienation provision a nullity.25 Finally, any previously announced
and currently existing exceptions to the ERISA anti-alienability
provision are few in number and all fall within the underlying pol-
icy of the statute; any exceptions and modifications to the pro-
nounced policy are to be made by the legislature.
2 6
The Supreme Court, in an opinion written by Justice Blackmun,
echoed the view expressed by both the district and appeals courts
that section 206(d)(1) of ERISA (the anti-alienability provision)
does indeed preclude the garnishment27 of a pension plan partici-
pant's vested benefits notwithstanding any criminal acts that he
may have committed against his employer who maintains the plan
appeals of various circuits illustrating the apparent inconsistency in application of the anti-
alienability provision. The cases cited by the Court, most of which are detailed below, are as
follows: Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville v Irving Trust Co., 786 F2d 466 (2nd Cir 1986)
(imposition of constructive trust rejected where employee of company maintaining a pension
plan defrauded customers and company became liable to customers for the fraud), United
Metal Products v National Bank of Detroit, 811 F2d 297 (6th Cir 1987) (garnishment of
pension benefits rejected where employee embezzled funds from company, thereby injuring
co-workers), St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v Cox, 752 F2d 550 (11th Cir 1985) (garnish-
ment of pension benefits of an employee who injured employer through criminal conduct
was upheld), Crawford v La Boucherie Bernard Ltd., 815 F2d 117 (D C Cir 1987), and
Goldstein v Crawford, 484 US 943 (1987) (trustee of employer's pension plan had his pen-
sion benefits offset against a civil judgment for breaching his fiduciary duty to the plan). Id,
n. 9.
22. All justices concurred in the opinion with the exception of Justice Marshall, who
concurred in all of the opinion except Part II-C in which the Court expressed the view that
exceptions to ERISA's anti-alienability provision are to be made by Congress and not the
courts. Id at 682.
23. Id at 685.
24. Id.
25. Id at 686.
26. Id at 687.
27. "The term 'garnishment' denotes a proceeding by a creditor to obtain satisfaction
of the indebtedness out of property or credits of the debtor in the possession of, or owing
by, a third person." 6 Am Jur 2d, Attachment and Garnishment § 2 (1963).
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or against his coworkers. 8 This finding has ample support in "and
is consistent with applicable administrative regulations,29 with the
relevant legislative history,3" and with the views of other federal
courts1 ." 2
Having found such clear judicial and legislative determinations
that pension benefits not be subject to garnishment, the Court con-
cluded that the constructive trust as a judicial remedy is of no sig-
nificant difference and that it is precluded by the anti-alienability
provision for the same reasons that garnishment is precluded "un-
less some exception to the general statutory ban is applicable. '33
The Supreme Court, continuing its analysis, next addressed and
rebutted the specific rationales for the district and appeals courts'
decisions. The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Cir-
cuit based-its holding that a constructive trust did not violate the
28. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 685. The Court had expressed this same view in dictum of a
1988 decision, Mackey v Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486 US 825 (1988).
There, the Court held that the ERISA bar to alienability only applied to the garnishment of
pension benefits and did not apply to the garnishment of welfare benefits. A judgment cred-
itor of individuals who were participants in a welfare benefit plan maintained by their em-
ployer sought to garnish the funds in the plan from which the participants could draw vaca-
tion and holiday pay. Mackey, 486 US at 827. "Welfare benefit plans [as defined by ERISA
- 29 USC § 1002 (1)] provide health, legal, vacation, or training benefits." Mackey, 486 US
at 827, n.1. The Supreme Court held that section 206(d)(1) of ERISA is a specific bar on
alienation of pension benefits and although welfare benefits are governed by ERISA, and
although garnishment of pension benefits would be prohibited by section 206(d)(1), the fact
that the proscription is directed expressly at pension benefits makes it unlikely that Con-
gress intended such a ban on alienation of welfare benefits. Mackey, 486 US at 836.
29. Regulations to the Internal Revenue Code state: "a trust will not be qualified un-
less the plan of which the trust is a part provides that benefits provided under the plan may
not be anticipated, assigned (either at law or in equity), alienated or subject to attachment,
garnishment, levy, execution or other legal or equitable process." 26 CFR 1.401(a)-13(b)(1)
(1989) (emphasis added).
30. One of the expressed exceptions to the ERISA anti-alienability provision is that a
plan participant may make "any voluntary and revocable assignment of not to exceed 10%
of any benefit payment." 29 USC § 1056(d)(2). "The [House of Representatives] Conference
Report [on ERISA] states: '[flor purposes of this rule, a garnishment or levy is not to be
considered a voluntary assignment.'" 110 S Ct 685, n.11 (quoting HR Conf Rep No 93-1280,
p 280 (1974)). (Emphasis added.)
31. Although some courts of appeals have determined that equitable remedies may be
invoked in spite of the ERISA anti-alienability provision, those same courts have also stated
that "as a general matter" garnishment is not one of the limited equitable exceptions. See,
Cox and Crawford, both cited in note 20. 110 S Ct 685, n.12.
In Cox, where the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit upheld the garnishment of an
employee's pension benefits, the court admitted that "'[the federal cases have construed
ERISA's provision against assignment or alienation as prohibiting garnishment generally,'
General Motors Corp. v Buha, 623 F2d 455 (6th Cir 1980)." Cox, 752 F2d at 551.
32. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 685.
33. Id.
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anti-alienability provision on section 409(a) of ERISA which pro-
vides that a pension plan fiduciary may be personally liable for
any losses experienced by the plan due to the breach of his fiduci-
ary duty to the plan and that such losses may be restored by equi-
table or remedial relief which a court deems appropriate.34
Although Guidry had been a fiduciary of one of the pension
plans, the Supreme Court, without deciding the applicability of
section 206(d)(1) of ERISA (the anti-alienability provision) to sec-
tion 409(a), determined that application of section 409(a) was
wholly inappropriate to the facts of the instant case because there
had been no finding that Guidry had stolen any money from the
pension plans.3 5 Guidry admitted to stealing money from the
Union and although such acts may constitute a breach of a fiduci-
ary's duty to the Union in violation of LMRDA section 501(a),
there had been no alleged theft from the Union's pension plan, nor
was the actual embezzlement of Union funds done by Guidry in his
capacity as a trustee of the pension plan. 36 Moreover, the $275,000
judgment stipulated to by the parties was held by the Union and
not the plans.3 7 The Court conceded that it would not be uncom-
mon for one to associate the Union with the pension funds that it
maintains, however, "the funds here and the Union are distinct le-
gal entities."38 Therefore, the Court stated that Guidry could not
be held to have breached his fiduciary duty to the pension plan
when he had been found only to have embezzled money from the
Union.39
The Court, in evaluating the district court's rationale of impos-
ing a constructive trust and its reliance on the expressed underly-
ing policy40 and the "remedial provision '"1 of LMRDA assumed,
34. Id at 685. Section 409(a) of ERISA states in part: "[any person who is a fiduciary
with respect to a plan who breaches any of the responsibilities, obligations, or duties im-
posed upon fiduciaries by this title shall personally be liable to make good to such plan any
losses to the plan resulting from each such breach, and to restore to such plan any profits of
such fiduciary which have been made through use of assets of the plan by the fiduciary, and
shall be subject to such other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem appropri-
ate .. " 29 USC § 1109(a).
Among the obligations that a plan fiduciary is charged with owing to the plan is to dis-
charge his duties "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence" of an ordinary prudent per-
son. 29 USC § 1104(a)(1)(B).
35. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 685.
36. Id.
37. Id at 686.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. See note 20.
41. Section 501(b) of LMRDA provides: "[w]hen any officer, agent, shop steward, or
Vol. 29:139
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without deciding that a constructive trust may be anticipated by
the statute's "other appropriate relief" language in certain situa-
tions; however, the Court criticized the district court's determina-
tion that the ERISA anti-alienability provision did not preclude
such measures in this case.42
While the district court made its determination on the basis of
reading LMRDA section 501(b) and section 206(d)(1) of ERISA in
pari materia, the Supreme Court said that "[s]uch an approach
would eviscerate the protections of section 206(d). . . ."" In reach-
ing its conclusion, the district court had ignored a polestar of stat-
utory construction, that where there is no indication of how two
seemingly conflicting statutes should be applied with respect to
each other, the general shall yield to the specific." The Court sug-
gested that a more plausible reading of the two statutes would be
"that the LMRDA determines what sort of judgment the aggrieved
party may obtain, while ERISA governs the narrow question
whether that judgment may be collected through a particular
means - a constructive trust placed on the pension.' ' 5
Finally, the Supreme Court invoked the clear legislative policy
behind ERISA's anti-alienability mandate - that the pension bene-
fits of employees be protected for the employees' dependents as
well as for the employees themselves.4 Where an employee has
committed criminal acts that have resulted in injury to his em-
ployer, it is likely that his dependents had no part in the wrongdo-
ing and, therefore, should not be punished for the employee's mal-
feasance.4 7 The Court said that the ERISA anti-alienability
provision is a deliberate decision on the part of Congress to exe-
cute the foundational policy of ERISA and that "[a] restriction on
garnishment therefore can be defended only on the view that the
effectuation of certain broad social policies sometimes takes prece-
representative of any labor organization is alleged to have violated the duties declared in
subsection [5011(a) of this section and the labor organization or its governing board or of-
ficers refuse or fail to sue or recover damages or secure an accounting or other appropriate
relief within a reasonable period of time after being requested to do so by any member of
the labor organization, such member may sue such [person] . . . to recover damages or se-
cure an accounting or other appropriate relief for the benefit of the labor organization." 29
USC § 501(b) (emphasis added).
42. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 686.
43. Id at 687.
44. Id.
45. Id (emphasis in original).
46. Id at 687.
47. Id at 688.
1990
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dence over the desire to do equity between particular parties." '
The Court declared that in the absence of legislative guidance, the
task of the judiciary attempting to create exceptions to the ERISA
anti-alienability provision without undermining the ERISA policy
itself is daunting and is one best left for Congress, particularly if it
means modifying the policy.
49
Congress enacted ERISA, in relevant part, for the expressed
purpose of "protect[ing] interstate commerce, and the interests of
participants in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries.
50
This purpose was based on a congressional finding that substantial
assets were contained in these plans; and
that the continued well-being and security of millions of employees and
their dependents are directly affected by these plans; . . . that owing to the
lack of employee information and adequate safeguards concerning their op-
eration, it is desirable in the interests of employees and their beneficiaries,
and to provide for the general welfare and the free flow of commerce, that
disclosure be made and safeguards be provided with respect to the estab-
lishment, operation and administration of such plans; . . . [and] that owing
to the termination of plans before requisite funds have been accumulated,
employees and their beneficiaries have been deprived of anticipated bene-
fits. . . ,"'6
ERISA's anti-alienability provision52 originally contained only
one exception. It allowed a plan participant to voluntarily and rev-
ocably assign up to 10% of any benefit payment to which he was
entitled.
5 3
As cases developed in which parties urged courts to adopt im-
plied exceptions to the anti-alienability provision, the paucity of
legislative history concerning the provision required the courts to
look elsewhere to infer legislative intent."4
One of the first serious challenges to the view that the anti-alien-
ability provision is to be strictly construed and that the voluntary
48. Id at 687 (emphasis in original).
49. Id.
50. 29 USC § 1001(b).
51. 29 USC § 1001(a).
52. 29 .USC § 1056(d)(1).
53. 29 USC § 1056(d)(2). "For the purposes of paragraph (1) of this subsection [sec-
tion 1056(d)], there shall not be taken into account any voluntary and revocable assignment
of not to exceed 10 percent of any benefit payment, or of any irrevocable assignment or
alienation of benefits executed before the date of enactment of this Act [enacted Sept. 2,
19741. Id.
54. See Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville v Irving Trust Co., 786 F2d 466 (2nd Cir
1986) ("Because the legislative history on section 1056 is sparse, we are compelled to con-,
sider other indicia of legislative intent."). Id at 470.
Vol. 29:139
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assignment is the only exception to the mandate came in the area
of alienation of benefits for failure of a plan participant to fulfill
court-ordered family support obligations. Two district court deci-
sions from 1978 marked an implied exception to 29 USC section
1056(d) and, in so doing, foreshadowed what would eventually be-
come an expressed exception prescribed by Congress. 5
In Stone v Stone,5" the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California held that ERISA section 206(d) did
not preclude the efficacy of California's community property laws
with respect to a husband's pension benefits. Noel Stone obtained
a divorce decree form the California district court which provided
that the pension benefits of her husband were community property
and as such, 40% represented her interest in that property. 7 The
husband subsequently failed to turn over any of the pension assets,
whereupon Noel brought an action against the pension plan to re-
cover the portion of her ex-husband's benefit awarded her in the
divorce decree.5 8
In determining that ERISA section 206(d) does not pre-empt
California's community property laws, the district court undertook
to read the statute and legislative intent with the view that Con-
gress recognizes that regulation in the area of family support is one
controlled by the states and that there is a presumption that Con-
gress, in its enactments, does not intend to interfere with states'
control in that field unless such intent is clearly expressed. 9
The district court determined that Congress could not have in-
tended community property laws to be pre-empted since ERISA
was intended to protect those same individuals who were among
the intended beneficiaries of the community property laws - de-
pendents of the participant.6 0 The court stated, "It would be ironic
indeed if a provision designed in part to ensure that an employee
spouse would be able to meet his obligations to family after retire-
ment were interpreted to permit him to evade them with impunity
after divorce.""
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York reached a similar result with respect to a state court spousal
55. 29 USC § 1056(d)(3).
56. 450 F Supp 919 (N D Cal 1978).
57. Id at 920.
58. Id.
59. Id at 924.




support order in Cody v Riecker 2 In that case, the Family Court
of the State of New York levied the pension benefits of a pension
plan participant for his failure to pay support to his former wife in
contravention of a court order. 3 The trustees of the husband's
pension plan brought an action against the Family Court and the
sheriff to enjoin the levy, invoking ERISA section 206(d). 4
The district court cited Stone in implying a family support ex-
ception to ERISA's proscription on alienation of benefits. How-
ever, the court relied predominantly on other statutory areas which
have had implied in them, with respect to family support obliga-
tions, exceptions to statutorily created benefits safeguards against
alienation.6 5 The Cody court pointed to the District of Columbia
Life Insurance Act which expressly precluded disability benefits
from being attached or garnished or taken "by any legal or equita-
ble process to pay any debt of liability of such insured person. "66
The court cited the reasoning of the appeals court for the District
of Columbia in Schlaefer v Schlaefer,67 that to withhold disability
benefits from dependents would defeat the intent of the statute in
that the dependents of disability payment recipients were to be the
beneficiaries of the ban on alienation of the disability payments.66
Similarly, the court reasoned, protecting pension benefits of a pen-
sion plan participant who refuses to abide by a court-ordered sup-
port obligation would contravene the intent behind ERISA, which
is to protect employees and their dependents.9
The district court holdings in Cody and Stone were followed
when the issue of an implied exception for family support reached
a United States court of appeals for the first time in American
Telephone & Telegraph Co. v Merry.7° The Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit found the holdings and rationales of Cody and
Stone persuasive in holding that an implied exception to the
ERISA anti-alienability provision exists when family support obli-
62. 454 F Supp 22 (E D NY 1978).
63. Id at 23.
64. Id.
65. Id at 24.
66. Id at 24-25 (emphasis added).
67. 112 F2d 177 (D C Cir 1940).
68. Cody, 454 F Supp at 25.
69. Id.
70. 592 F2d 118 (1979). Appeals for both Cody and Stone were taken to the courts of
appeals for the Second and Ninth Circuits, respectively and were pending at the time the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit ruled on the Merry case. Id at 121, 122. The courts
of appeals affirmed both district court decisions. See 594 F2d 314 (2nd Cir 1979) and 632
F2d 740 (9th Cir 1980).
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gations of an employee are at.stake.7'
Addison Merry, an employee of defendant, AT&T, and Ann
Merry, the plaintiff, were divorced and obtained a divorce decree
from the Connecticut Superior Court. 72 The decree provided that
alimony and child support were to total one-half of Mr. Merry's
retirement benefits from AT&T's pension plan.73 When Mr. Merry
failed to make support payments, the Connecticut Superior Court
issued a contempt order and subsequently a garnishment order at-
taching $22,422.34 of Mr. Merry's pension benefits.7 1 Upon receiv-
ing the garnishment order, AT&T brought an action in the Federal
District Court for declaratory judgment.75 AT&T invoked section
206(d) of ERISA, contending that the garnishment order should
not be enforced.76
The court cited, in addition to the Cody and Stone decisions,
other federal statutes containing anti-alienability type provisions
which had been subject to judicial determinations that those provi-
sions were not intended to result in the individual protected by the
ban evading child support and alimony payments. The court rea-
soned that by analogy, the ERISA proscription could not have
been intended by Congress, to defeat family support obligations.77
For example, before the Bankruptcy Act 78 was amended such that
support obligations would not be discharged by bankruptcy,79 the
United States Supreme Court held that a husband's discharged
debts should not include alimony and child support, for if they
did, the general policy of law to enforce support obligations would
be defeated. 0 Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia had held that support obligations should
not be treated as ordinary debts in implying an exception to the
anti-garnishment provision of the Life Insurance Act for the Dis-
71. Merry, 592 F2d at 122.
72. Id at 119.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. Id at 120.
76. Id at 122.
77. Id at 123.
78. 11 USC §§ 1-1080. The Bankruptcy Act was recodified with the 1978 Bankruptcy
Code (11 USC §§ 101-1330)
79. Merry was decided before enactment of the 1978 Bankruptcy Act. The former Act
at 11 USC § 35 provided in part: "(a) A discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt
from all of his provable debts, whether allowable in full or in part, except such as . . . (7)
are for alimony due or to become due, or for maintenance or support of wife or child .
11 USC § 35(a)(7). These exceptions are now codified at 11 USC § 523(a).
80. Wetmore v Markoe, 196 US 68 (1904).
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trict of Columbia.s"
Congress formally recognized this judicially created exception by
adding section 206(d)(3)82 to ERISA's anti-alienability provision in
1984.83 This subsection expressly exempts from the anti-alienabil-
ity clause, "qualified domestic relations orders."8 '
Some of the early, albeit unsuccessful, attempts at creating an
implied exception to the anti-alienability provision in cases where
an employee had committed fraud or theft against his employer
came in New York state and federal courts. In the 1980 case
Helmsley-Spear, Inc. v Winter,s5 the New York State Supreme
Court, Appellate Division refused to imply an exception to section
206(d) of ERISA where an employee had been convicted of grand
larceny in stealing checks from his employer.8 8
The New York Supreme Court had previously issued an order
attaching the employee's benefits in a profit sharing plan main-
tained by the plaintiff employer.8 7 The employee contested the or-
der on the ground that ERISA section 206(d) prohibited such an
attachment.8 The plaintiff posited that an exception to the anti-
alienability provision should be made for tort creditors who main-
tain pension or profit sharing plans which end up benefitting the
tortfeasor.8 9 The court refused to do so, stating simply, "We see
nothing in the statutes carving out such an exception. And we note
81. Merry, 592 F2d at 124 (referring to Schlaefer v Schlaefer, 112 F2d 177 (D C Cir
1940)). See notes 65-69 and accompanying text.
82. 29 USC § 1056(d)(3)(A).
83. Id.
84. Id. A qualified domestic relations order is, by definition, a domestic relations
order -
(I) which creates or recognizes the existence of an alternate payee's right to, or as-
signs to an alternate payee the right to, receive all or a portion of the benefits payable
with respect to a participant under a plan, and
(II) with respect to which the requirements of subparagraphs (1056(d)(3)(C) and (D)]
are met. ...
29 USC § 1056(d)(3)(B)(i).
29. USC § 1056(d)(3)(B)(ii) defines "domestic relations order" as
any judgment, decree, or order (including approval of a property settlement agree-
ment) in which-
(I) relates to the provision of child support, alimony payments, or marital property
rights to a spouse, former spouse, child, or other dependent of a participant, and
(II) is made pursuant to a State domestic relations law (including a community prop-
erty law).
85. 74 AD2d 195, 426 NYS2d 778 (1980).
86. Id at 779.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id at 781.
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'strong public policy against forfeiture of employee benefits mani-
fested by [ERISA].' "90
The rather terse rationale in Helmsley-Spear, Inc. was amplified
in 1982 by the United States District Court for the Southern Dis-
trict of New York in Vink v SHV North America Holding Corp.9a
There, the defendant employer (SHV) urged the court to imply a
"fraud" exception to the ERISA bans on forfeiture and alienability
of pension benefits.9 2 The defendant's employee, plaintiff therein
(Vink), was convicted of receiving a bribe from one of the em-
ployer's customers and for making representations on a bank ap-
plication that SHV's board of directors had agreed to guarantee
payment on a personal loan to Vink.9 3
SHV refused to pay Vink any of his vested pension benefits,
whereupon Vink brought the principal action to recover such bene-
fits.9' SHV, relying on American Telephone & Telegraph Co. v
Merry, 95 based its argument that an exception should be implied,
in large part, on the rationale for the family support obligation ex-
ception; that just as public policy will not tolerate an individual
being relieved of his support obligations under the guise of a stat-
ute intended to protect his income, it should not accept an un-
faithful employee who has committed criminal fraud against his
employer collecting retirement benefits provided by that em-
ployer.9 The court dismissed this analogy however, saying that the
reasons for implying a support exception do not exist in cases
where the employee has committed fraud against the employer.9 7
In laying out its rationale, the court focused specifically on the suc-
cessful arguments in Merry.
First, according to the court, unlike with family maintenance, no
90. Id (quoting Post v Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 48 NY2d 84, 88,
421 NYS2d 847, 849, 397 NE2d 358, 360 (1979)).
91. 549 F Supp 268 (S D NY 1982).
92. Id at 271.
93. Id at 269. In addition, SHV alleged that Vink had received thousands of dollars in
kickbacks from SHV customers and "diverted more than three million dollars of SHV busi-
ness to dummy corporations that he had set up with his wife as sole shareholder." Id.
94. Id. The district court was unsure as to whether the basis of SHV's refusal to dis-
burse Vink's pension benefits was a forfeiture or a mode of "involuntary assignment." The
court addressed both mechanisms, however. The court did not draw a clear distinction in its
discussion between the two, phrasing its reasoning in such a manner as would apply to both
forfeiture and alienation equally. (The discussion in the main text of this Note is couched in
terms that apply to alienation and assignment only). Id at 270.
95. Merry, 592 F2d at 118.




historically entrenched presumption exists that, absent an intent
clearly expressed otherwise by Congress, the area of employee
fraud against employers is to be controlled by the states. 8 In fact,
the court contended that Congress intended the anti-alienability
provision to eliminate "bad boy" clauses99 in retirement plans
which closely approximate the implied exception that the employer
was urging the court to adopt in the present case. 00
Second, the family support exception directly effectuates the in-
tent that Congress had in enacting ERISA, i.e., to benefit depen-
dents of employees as well as the employees themselves.' 0' A fraud
exception, according to the court, would certainly not benefit em-
ployees' dependents; rather it would, in fact, be inimical to their
well-being since the alienated assets would go to the employer and
not the dependents.1
0 2
Third, in cases antedating the instant case which involved the
family support exception,0 3 the United States Departments of La-
bor and Treasury, the executive branch agencies charged with en-
forcing the provisions of ERISA, filed amicus briefs in support of
an implied family support obligation exception. 04 Such had never
been the case with a case involving an implied exception for em-
ployee fraud.10 5 In fact, in a previous employee fraud case, the De-
partment of Labor sued an employer on behalf of an employee in
an Eighth Circuit district court, urging the court not to imply an
exception for employee misconduct. 108
Finally, the district court noted the abundance of case law in
which the family support exception was recognized (most notably,
the aforementioned Merry,0 7 Cody,10 8 and Stone'08 cases)as com-
pared with the dearth of cases adopting an employee fraud
98. Id.
99. Id. "Bad boy" clauses are provisions in a pension plan which "generally provide
that employees who were dishonest, engaged in acts of misconduct, or competed with his
former company after leaving it would forfeit their pension benefits." Id at 270.
100. Id.
101. Id at 271. "[O]ne of Congress' key objectives in enacting ERISA, [was] 'the con-
tinued well-being and security of employees and their dependents.' 29 USC § 1001(a) (em-
phasis added)." Vink, 549 F Supp at 271.
102. Id.
103. See for example, Merry, 592 F2d at 125.
104. Vink, 549 F Supp at 271.
105. Id.
-106. Id. Winer v Edison Brothers Stores Pension Plan, 593 F2d 307 (8th Cir 1979).
107. Merry, 592 F2d 118.
108. Cody, 454 F Supp 22.




In 1985, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit", found
that an implied exception to the anti-alienability provision exists
for criminal acts committed by an employee against his em-
ployer. 112 The court, however, did not attack or refute the holding
and rationale in Vink. The defendant, Cox, was the president of
the Alabama City Bank of Gadsden." 3 He was charged and "con-
victed of willfully and knowingly misapplying bank funds, with the
intent to injure and defraud the bank in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
656." I 4" The bank's insurer, the plaintiff in the case, after paying
the bank the $152,000 claim and having been assigned the bank's
rights against Cox, obtained a judgment against Cox in the amount
of the insurance proceeds and subsequently brought an action to
garnish the vested pension and profit sharing benefits that Cox
had earned while employed by the bank, such plans having been
maintained by the bank." 8
The district court held that the ERISA anti-alienability provi-
sion was not intended by Congress to defeat the maxim of equity,
that a wrongdoer should not benefit by his own wrongs, and, conse-
quently, issued an order garnishing Cox's benefits."
6
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit af-
firmed the district court's decision, basing its decision ostensibly
on the rationale which evolved into the implied exception for fam-
ily support obligations, i.e., "the congressional objectives behind
ERISA, and the effect of the proposed [implied] exceptions on
those goals.""' 7 The appeals court seized on the expressed congres-
sional purpose that ERISA was "to protect 'the continued well-
being and security of millions of employees and their dependents'
by providing 'minimum standards. . . assuring the equitable char-
acter of [pension fund] plans and their financial soundness.'""'
However, rather than focusing on the congressional intent with re-
110. Vink, 549 F Supp at 272.
111. In St. Paul Fire and Marine Insurance Co. v Cox, 752 F2d 550 (11th Cir 1985).
112. Id at 551.
113. Id.
114. Id. 18 USC section 656 provides in relevant part: "[wihoever, being an officer,
director, agent or employee of, or connected in any capacity with any . . . national bank
. . . embezzles, abstracts, purloins or willfully misapplies any of the moneys, funds or cred-
its of such bank . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both .. " 18 USC § 656.
115. Cox, 752 F2d at 551.
116. Id.
117. Id at 552.
118. Id (quoting 29 USC § 1001(a)).
1990
Duquesne Law Review
spect to dependents of employees, the court found in the passage
which it quoted from ERISA the purpose of ERISA to be "to pro-
tect the employee against mismanagement or the provision of mis-
information by the employer." 1 9
Not finding any indication that ERISA was intended to protect
the employee from his own criminal misdeeds, the court held that
the anti-alienability provision did not apply to garnishment in the
instant case and that the articulated purpose of ERISA would be
effectuated by such measures since "the financial stability of the
employer and, indirectly, the employer's financial plan," would
best be served.
1 20
In 1987, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Cir-
cuit, in Crawford v La Boucherie Bernard Ltd.,' 21 cited, inter alia,
the holding and rationale in Cox in holding that the pension bene-
fits of a trustee of a pension plan could be off-set by a judgment
against the trustee for breach of his fiduciary duty to the plan, not-
withstanding the ERISA proscription on alienability of pension
benefits. 122
Bernard Goldstein, defendant in the district court, was the chief
executive officer of La Boucherie Bernard Ltd. and was the trustee
of its profit sharing plan. 23 He was alleged to have breached his
fiduciary duty to the plan by transferring money from the plan to
La Boucherie Bernard Ltd. and its affiliated partnership, BRIL
Associates, to satisfy obligations of those entities. 24 Fifteen par-
ticipants of the La Boucherie profit sharing plan brought an action
against Goldstein in federal district court alleging breach of fiduci-
ary duty and violation of certain prohibited transaction provisions
under ERISA.1
25
119. Cox, 752 F2d at 552.
120. Id.
121. 815 F2d 117 (D C Cir 1987).
122. Id.
123. Id at 118.
124. Id.
125. Id. Among the provisions of ERISA which Goldstein was accused of violating
were:
(1) as a plan fiduciary, failing to discharge his duties-
(a) "for the exclusive purpose of providing benefits to [plan] participants and their
beneficiaries" (29 USC § 1104(a)(1)(A));
(b) "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence" of an ordinary prudent person (29
USC § 1104(a)(1)(B));
(c) by failing to diversify plan investments in order to minimize the risk of financial
loss (29 USC § 1104(a)(1)(C)); and
(d) in accordance with the instruction of the plan language (29 USC § 1104(a)(1)(D));
(2) engaging in a transaction constituting a "transfer to, or use by or for the benefit of
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The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the
plaintiffs and entered a judgment in the amount of $976,822.38.126
When Goldstein failed to satisfy the judgment, the plaintiffs
sought and were granted an order from the district court offsetting
the judgment against Goldstein's profit sharing benefits. 12 7 Gold-
stein appealed, saying that such action was barred. by section
206(d) of ERISA (the anti-alienability clause).12
In refuting the petitioner's argument, the court of appeals
agreed with the Eleventh Circuit holding in Cox that section
206(d) should not apply where the employee would benefit from
his own tortious acts. 12 The court also stated that where the appli-
cation of section 206(d) would undermine the ERISA policy of pro-
tecting the security of employees and their dependents by threat-
ening the security of the plan, it should not be applied.'10
Due to the factual difference from Cox - that in the instant
case the employee was a trustee of the plan and that his malfea-
sance harmed that plan directly - the court buttressed its holding
with the language of section 409 of ERISA which states that "a
person who breaches his fiduciary duties to a pension plan 'shall be
personally liable to make good to such plan any losses to the plan
resulting from each such breach, . . . and shall be subject to such
other equitable or remedial relief as the court may deem
appropriate.' "Is'
.Finally, in Ellis National Bank of Jacksonville v Irving Trust
Co., 112 the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
refused to apply a constructive trust on the pension benefits of an
employee who had committed fraud against customers of his em-
ployer and in doing so, left the employer liable to the customers
for over $3 million. 33 The employee was a participant in the em-
ployer's Employee Savings Plan and had pleaded nolo contendere
a party in interest, of any assets of the plan (29 USC § 1106(a)(1)(D); and
(3) dealing with plan assets-
(a) for the fiduciary's own interests (29 USC § 1106(b)(1)); and
(b) on behalf of a party whose interests are adverse to those of the plan or plan
participants (29 USC § 1106(b)(2)).
Crawford, 815 F2d at 118.
126. Id at 119.
127. Id.
128. Id at 121.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id at 119 (quoting 29 USC § 1109(a)).
132. 786 F2d 466 (2nd Cir 1986).
133. Id at 468.
1990.
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to eight counts of grand theft and securities fraud in connection
with unauthorized transactions in the employer's customers'
accounts.""
The employer urged the court to imply an exception to the anti-
alienability provision where the employee beneficiary of a pension
plan maintained by his employer has engaged in criminal activity
which ultimately involves the employer and where the funds (or a
portion thereof) which represent the employee's pension benefits
are directly linked to the criminal acts. 35
Citing the successful adoption of an implied exception for family
support obligations articulated in Merry, the court applied the
four-part Vink analysis and, as in Vink, concluded that an excep-
tion to ERISA section 206(d) should not be implied in cases of
employees injuring their employer through fraudulent miscon-
duct." 6 First, regulation of employee relations are not deeply
rooted in state authority, unlike domestic support obligations. 3 7
Second, an implied theft and fraud exception would not further
the ERISA mandate of providing security for employees and their
dependents.' Third, the Departments of Labor and Treasury had
not supported such an exception, while they had supported a fam-
ily support exception as evidenced by their filing amicus briefs urg-
ing adoption of that exception."39 Fourth, there have been few
courts which have recognized an implied fraud exception, whereas,
by comparison, numerous courts have recognized the family sup-
port exception.
40
The court expressly rejected the holding in Cox, stating that
such an exception ignores the congressional directive manifested in
ERISA, that the anti-alienability provision was to provide security
to employees and their dependents."' The court added, that if
such an exception is to be made, it should only be made by
134. Id at 467. The employee (Kalil) was a commissioned stock broker with the bro-
kerage firm of Bache & Company and subsequently an officer with its successor, Prudential
Bache. Id.
135. Id at 469. Certain commissions received by Kalil as a result of the fraudulent
transactions with customers' accounts were deposited directly by Prudential Bache into
Kalil's pension account. Id at 467.
136. Id at 470-71.
137. Id at 470.
138. Id at 470-71.
139. Id at 471. See Merry, 592 F2d at 118 and Cartledge v Miller, 457 F Supp 1146 (S
D NY 1978).





In the Guidry decision, the Supreme Court settled the issue of
whether a court may imply a criminal fraud exception to ERISA
section 206(d)(1). A simplification, indeed an oversimplification of
the Guidry holding would be that a criminal fraud exception to the
anti-alienability provision is for Congress and not the courts to
make. A number of courts had previously passed on the question
of whether they should imply the exception and reached varying
results in doing so. For this reason, Guidry's value is not limited to
its seemingly basic holding; but rather its importance lies in the
Supreme Court's analysis of the arguments presented in the case
and those which preceded it.
The Supreme Court's purpose in deciding the dispute presented
in Guidry was whether it was the intent of Congress to exempt
from the anti-alienability protection of ERISA, employee partici-
pants in an employer-sponsored pension plan who have committed
wrongs against their employer. This is a far different question than
whether the anti-alienability protection should apply to an em-
ployee participant in an employer-sponsored plan who has commit-
ted wrongs against his employer.
While the United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Cir-
cuit in Cox and both the district and circuit courts in Guidry os-
tensibly based their finding of an implied exception to ERISA sec-
tion 206(d)(1) on their interpretations of congressional intent,
arguably, one could infer from reading those courts' opinions that
the courts started their analyses with a desired conclusion that the
faithless employee should not be given a reprieve from equitable
sanctions by the ERISA anti-alienability clause. While the conclu-
sion is laudable, the Supreme Court's analysis in Guidry demon-
strates that it is also untenable; support for such a result is
soundly outweighed by traditional indicia of legislative intent and
principles of statutory construction.
In analyzing factors which militate against the creation of a judi-
cially implied exception to the anti-alienability clause, one need
only look at the language of the statute: "[e]ach pension plan shall
provide that benefits provided under the plan may not be assigned
or alienated.' 4
3
A tenet of statutory construction is that the starting point in
142. Id.
143. 29 USC § 1056(d)(1).
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construing a statute is to examine its plain meaning.4 ERISA sec-
tion 206(d)(1) is an unambiguous prohibition on alienation. In the
statute's language there are no qualifiers intimating that Congress
anticipated certain exceptions to the statute's command. The few
exceptions that have been made are narrow in scope and have been
formally recognized by Congress. 14 6
Other, less direct indications of the congressional intention that
the anti-alienability protection is to be absolute can be found: (1)
in the preamble to ERISA where Congress expressed the underly-
ing policy of the law by stating that one of Congress' purposes in
enacting ERISA was "to protect . . . the interests of participants
in employee benefit plans and their beneficiaries; 148 (2) in adminis-
trative regulations promulgated by executive branch agencies
charged with the enforcement of ERISA and its provisions;14 7 and
(3) in previous judicial interpretations of congressional intent.4 8
The factors which have been cited in support of a judicially cre-
ated exception to the anti-alienability provision in cases of employ-
ees' wrongful acts against their employers can be considered an in-
direct expression of congressional intent at best. These factors
tend to invoke the absence of expressed legislative intent as a li-
cense to imply such an exception.
For example, in Cox, the court noted the purpose of ERISA to
be "to protect 'the continued well-being and security of millions of
employees and their dependents' by providing 'minimum stan-
144. Ernst & Ernst v Hochfelder, 425 US 185, 197 (1976).
145. The voluntary assignment exception, 29 USC § 1056(d)(2) (see note 30) and the
exception for qualified domestic relations orders, 29 USC § 1056(d)(3) (see notes 82-84 and
accompanying text) are the only statutory exceptions and the only exceptions recognized by
all federal and state courts.
146. 29 USC § 1001(b) (see notes 50 and 51 and accompanying text).
147. The Treasury Department issued regulations requiring that in order for a pension
plan to acquire "qualified" status, it must provide that pension benefits "may not be antici-
pated, assigned, . . . alienated or subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or
other legal or equitable process." 26 CFR 1.401(a)-13(b)(1) (1989).
148. Although there has not been complete unanimity among the circuit courts in de-
ciding the appropriateness of a judicially implied exception (Guidry, 110 S Ct at 684), the
clear majority of the circuits have refused to imply such an exception (see note 21). In fact,
of; the circuits which have found an employee criminal fraud exception to ERISA's anti-
alienability provision, only Cox, from the eleventh circuit (see notes 111-120 and accompa-
nying text) stated so unequivocally. In Crawford v La Boucherie Ltd., 815 F2d 117 (D C Cir
1987), (see notes 121-131 and accompanying text), although the court cited and affirmed the
Cox holding, the alleged wrongdoer was a trustee of a pension plan and his alleged wrongs
represented breaches of his fiduciary duty to the plan. As such, the court invoked ERISA
section 409(a) (29 USC § 1109(a)) concerning personal liability for breaches of a plan trus-
tee's fiduciary duty to the plan (see note 34).
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dards. . . assuring the equitable character of [pension fund] plans
and their financial soundness.' "149 However, the court observed
that "[tihe legislation provides no indication whatsoever that it is
intended to protect the employee against the consequences of his
own misdeeds.
15 0
Similarly, in the appeals court decision of Guidry, the court in-
ferred an intent of Congress from there being "no indication or
legislative history that an unscrupulous trustee should be shielded
from the consequences of his misdeed.
'151
The flaw in the reasoning of these courts is that one would not
expect to find a specific set of circumstances specified in law where
the general language of a statute appears to encompass those cir-
cumstances. To follow the reasoning of the Cox court and the court
of appeals in Guidry, one must inquire into the type of debt owed
and the conduct on the part of the pension plan beneficiary in de-
termining whether his pension benefits are subject to the anti-
alienability clause. It is indeed difficult to glean that Congress in-
tended this sort of exercise from a plain reading of ERISA section
206(d)(1).
Therefore, while the specter of a disloyal employee retaining his
employer-provided pension benefits due to the ERISA proscription
on alienation of benefits may be intuitively unpalatable, there ap-
pears to exist little persuasive authority to impute to Congress an
intention to the contrary. Although the equity-based notion that a
wrongdoer should not benefit by his own wrongs is well founded, it
must be assumed that Congress was aware of this maxim when it
enacted ERISA and that Congress determined that its policy of
protecting the pension benefits for the security of employees and
their dependents outweighed the occasional instance of an unfaith-
ful employee benefitting by wrongful acts committed against his
employer.
The Supreme Court's decision in Guidry represents more than
the last word on whether or not a judicially implied exception to
ERISA section 206(d)(1) should be made in cases of employees'
criminally fraudulent acts against their employers.
Not only did the respondents (the Union) in Guidry urge the
Court to adopt a judicially created exception to ERISA section
206(d)(1), the Union also based its argument that a constructive
149. Cox, 752 F2d at 552 (quoting 29 USC § 1001(a)).
150. Cox, 752 F2d at 552 (emphasis added).
151. Guidry, 856 F2d at 1457 (emphasis added).
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trust should be imposed on Curtis Guidry's pension benefits on ex-
isting law and in doing so urged the recognition of a statutorily
created exception to the anti-alienability provision.
The Union invoked ERISA section 409(a) 52 since Guidry, in ad-
dition to serving as a Union official, was also a trustee of Sheet
Metal Workers Local No. 9 Pension Fund.
153
The Court did not rule on the Union's suggestion that ERISA
section 409(a)'s provision for "other equitable or remedial relief as
the court may deem appropriate" where a plan fiduciary has
breached his duty imposed by ERISA15 4 represented an express ex-
ception to the anti-alienability provision.1 55 The Court instead
ruled that section 409(a) was inapplicable to the facts of the in-
stant case because there had been no showing that Guidry-
breached his duty to the Union's pension plans.1
5
While the Union pointed to the fact that the series of transac-
tions which constituted Guidry's embezzlement included the pen-
sion plan of which Guidry was a trustee, 57 the Union conceded "it
is hard to define precisely from which entity much of the money
was stolen.'
58
In determining whether a breach of fiduciary duty to the pension
plans occurred, the Court looked to the actual facts of the case.
The initial criminal action was brought pursuant to section 501(c)
of LMRDA (rather than ERISA section 409(a)) which addresses
monies or assets stolen from a labor organization by one of its of-
ficers.59 As the Supreme Court noted, a labor union and the pen-
sion plan that it sponsors "are distinct legal entities." 6 ' Although
those members of the Union who are injured by Guidry's criminal,
conduct may be indirectly injured in their capacity as participants
of the Union's pension plans, unless there is a threshold showing of
a breach of Guidry's fiduciary duty to the plans, the relief afforded
injured plan participants, even if it happens to include alienation
152. 29 USC § 1109(a). See note 34.
153. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 683, 685.
154. 29 USC § 1109(a).
155. Respondent's Brief at 32, Guidry v Sheet Metal Workers National Pension
Fund, - US -, 110 S Ct 680 (1990) (No. 88-1105).
156. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 685.
157. Respondent's Brief at 32, Guidry v Sheet Metal Workers National Pension
Fund, 110 S Ct 680 (1990) (No. 88-1105).
158. Id.
159. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 683. 29 USC § 501(c). See note 2.
160. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 686.
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of the wrongdoer's pension benefits, is inapplicable.'
The fact that no breach of fiduciary duty to the plans occurred is
supported by the fact that the Union and not the pension fund or
the pension fund and the Union held the $275,000 judgment to
which the parties stipulated and which was entered against Gui-
dry.162 Again, the critical distinction between the Union and the
pension funds must be made.
It should be noted that until the Supreme Court decision in Gui-
dry, Crawford v La Boucherie Ltd.163 had been cited along with
Cox'"4 in support of a judicially created exception to ERISA's anti-
alienability provision in cases of faithless employees. While the
Guidry decision was a final pronouncement that such an exception
should not be implied by the courts, the refusal of the Supreme
Court to make a definitive ruling on whether such an exception
could exist in cases where a plan fiduciary had breached his duty
to the plan in violation of ERISA section 409(a)165 has left the door
open for a statutorily created exception and therefore, at this junc-
ture, Crawford, unlike Cox, should remain good law.
The Union's "other" attempt at urging upon the Court a statu-
tory exception to ERISA section 206(d)(1), by invoking the provi-
sions of LMRDA, represents the most unique aspect of this case in
comparison to the line of preceding cases involving a criminal
fraud exception to the anti-alienability provision.
Since Guidry pleaded guilty to violating LMRDA section
501(c)" 66 and stipulated to the entry of judgment on the charge
that he violated LMRDA section 501(a), 67 that statute clearly has
relevance to the instant case. The remedial provision of LMRDA"6 '
provides for a private cause of action against violators of LMRDA
section 501(a).16 9 The relief provided in the statute includes the
recovery of damages, the securing of an accounting, "or other ap-
propriate relief.' 70 The Union made a deliberate and thorough ar-
gument that as evidenced through the legislative history of
LMRDA, Congress intended the imposition of traditional trust law
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. -See notes 121-131 and accompanying text.
164. See notes 111-120 and accompanying text.
165. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 685.
166. Id at 681. See note 2.
167. Id at 683, n.5. See note 10.
168. 29 USC § 501(b). See note 41.
169. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 686.
170. 29 USC § 501(b) (emphasis added).
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remedies, including a constructive trust, against violators of
LMRDA.1
71
The Union, after attempting to establish that a constructive
trust was contemplated by Congress in its enacting LMRDA sec-
tion 501(b), next invoked the saving clause of ERISA172 which
states: "Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed to alter,
amend, modify, invalidate, impair, or supersede any law of the
United States . . .or any rule or regulation issued under any such
law., 1
73
The Union argued that for ERISA section 206(d)(1) to prevent
the imposition of a constructive trust on Guidry's pension benefits,
LMRDA section 501(b) would be "altered" or "modified" in viola-
tion of ERISA § 514(d). , * While the Union's argument has intrin-
sic appeal, the Supreme Court noted that it ignores certain very
basic precepts of statutory construction.
Initially, the Supreme Court assumed arguendo that LMRDA
authorized the imposition of a constructive trust. 75 That being the
case, the imposition of a constructive trust on Guidry's pension
benefits is clearly an alienation of those benefits and therefore,
LMRDA section 501(b) and ERISA section 206(d)(1) are in irrec-
oncilable conflict.
In such a case, the specific prohibition on alienation must con-
trol over the general indirect provision for a constructive trust.'76
Furthermore, another guide in statutory construction not men-
171. Respondent's Brief at 13, Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers National Pension
Fund, 110 S Ct 680 (1990) (No. 88-1105). Much of the legislative discussion preceding the
passage of LMRDA centered on the fiduciary nature of labor union officials and the need for
adequate remedies for breaches of that fiduciary duty. Sen Rep No 187 on S 1555, at 72,
reprinted at I Legislative History of the Labor Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (Leg Hist) at 468. In contemplating federal regulation of labor unions, the Senate
recognized that while many of the acts prohibited by the prospective statute were already
deemed violations under the laws of most states, the Senate was concerned about providing
adequate relief to unions and union members so that violators of LMRDA could not elude
personal liability. Included in the discussion leading up to a vote on the legislation, certain
Senators likened a union official's position to that of an officer of a corporation and men-
tioned that faithless officers are subject to having constructive trusts imposed on any illgot-
ten gains obtained by means of breaches in their fiduciary duty to the corporation. 105 Cong
Rec S 5859 (Daily ed April 23, 1959), reprinted in II Leg Hist at 1133. The Senate's concern
was eventually expressed as the "other appropriate relief" language in the statute. 105 Cong
Rec S 5854-5861 (Daily ed April 23, 1959), reprinted at II Leg Hist, at 1128-1135.
172. 29 USC § 1144(d).
173. Guidry, 110 S Ct at 686.
174. Id.
175. Id at 686, n.16.
176. Id at 687.
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tioned by the Court is that the statute enacted later in time im-
plicitly repeals a former statute to the extent that there is conflict
between the two.' 7 7 Therefore, for purposes of the facts of the in-
stant case, since the statutes cannot be harmonized to effectuate
the expressed intention of each, ERISA, which was enacted in 1974
and is clear and narrow on the point of alienation, should repeal
the more general LMRDA provision which was enacted in 1959.
To most individuals, there is an inherent injustice in an em-
ployee retaining a benefit bestowed upon him through the gra-
ciousness of his employer when he has betrayed the employer by
his criminal acts. This situation falls squarely within the canon of
equity that a wrongdoer should not benefit from his own wrongs.
However, in the area of statutory law, seemingly unjust or unpopu-
lar results cannot be ameliorated solely by the invocation of equity.
A statute is a mandate by the legislature, and indirectly, its electo-
rate. The intent of the statute's makers is supreme and if in con-
flict with equitable principles, the latter must yield.
In the Guidry case, the Supreme Court decidedly favored the
specificity of Congress' expressed intent, the lack of equally spe-
cific expressed intent otherwise, and the importance that Congress
placed on pension plan participants and their dependents retain-
ing their vested pension benefits over less direct, less compelling
indicia of legislative intent and perhaps the visceral urge to pre-
vent an intuitive injustice.
The Supreme Court makes it clear that if an exception to
ERISA's anti-alienability provision is to be made in cases such as
Guidry, such an exception must be made by Congress. 7 '
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